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Association as client. Plaintiff deals only briefly with the 
latter two issues in his reply brief, however, a substantial 
portion of the reply brief is an attempt to explain away his 
conduct. Accordingly, this brief will deal primarily with 
plaintiff's attempt to justify his conduct. 
I. 
While the facts must be interpreted in the light 
most favorable to plaintiff, this does not mean that 
unfavorable facts and unfavorable inferences that must 
necessarily be drawn from those facts should be disregarded. 
Plaintiff argues that the Homeowners have improperly 
interpreted the facts, specifically claiming that the Homeowners 
have interpreted the facts in their favor when the law requires 
that the facts be interpreted in plaintiff's favor. Plaintiff's 
complaint is not so much that the facts have been misinterpreted 
as it is that inferences drawn from the undisputed facts are 
unfavorable to him. Indeed, plaintiff does not identify any 
specific material facts that he disputes, nor can he. 
While the plaintiff is entitled to have the facts 
interpreted in the light most favorable to him, that rule does 
not require that unfavorable facts be disregarded. Nor does it 
require that favorable inferences be drawn from facts where the 
only inferences reasonable minds could draw from the facts are 
unfavorable to plaintiff. Plaintiff is only entitled to those 
"reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn" from the facts. 
Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62, 63 (1964) 
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because public policy requires that an attorney not be permitted 
to increase his fee by having included an unlawful restriction on 
settlement in his fee agreement and the Homeowners* settlement to 
avoid trial was not a breach of the fee agreement. The 
interpretation of a contract is a question of law to be decided 
by the court, and even ambiguities in a contract are questions of 
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II. 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that 
plaintiff acted unreasonably in refusing to 
approve the Homeowners' settlement and in the 
prosecution of the suit against the Homeowners. 
The refusal to approve 
the settlement was unreasonable. 
With respect to the plaintiff's refusal to approve the 
Homeowners' settlement of the Homeowners' claims against the 
developer, there is no dispute that: 
1. The highest offer made by the developers to settle the 
Homeowners' claims prior to the end of the first trial was 
payment of $45,000. R. 1635. 
2. Prior to the second trial of the Homeowners' claims 
against the developers the developers had rejected plaintiff's 
proposal to settle the Homeowners' claims upon payment of 
$75,000f and counter offered to pay $47f000 to settle. R. 1635. 
3. Plaintiff estimated that there was a 75% chance of 
recovering between $50,000 and $80,000 at the second trial. 
R. 1634. 
4. The damage evidence introduced by plaintiff at the first 
trial on the claims which were to be retried was a maximum of 
$92,954.47. R. 307. 
5. If the case were trie:; or settled after trial began then 
plaintiff's share of any recovery would have been 10%. R. 1014, 
1636-1637. 
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6. Ten percent of the $92,954.47 in total damages shown in 
the first trial is $9,295.45. 
7. Plaintiff's net fee under the contingency fee agreement 
at the settlement accepted by the Homeowners was $15,250. The 
other $3f050 of the $18f300 contingent fee was to go to 
substitute counsel that had been specially brought in to try the 
case while plaintiff vacationed. R. 1006, 1636-1637. 
Even giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences in his favor that may be fairly drawn from these 
undisputed facts (and the other undisputed facts set forth in the 
Homeowners1 principal brief), the facts compel the conclusion 
that the plaintiff acted unreasonably in refusing to approve the 
$61,000 settlement. The settlement, though not fully 
compensating the Homeowners for their losses, was obviously 
within the expected range and produced a higher fee than could 
have been earned if the case had proceeded to trial or had 
settled anywhere within the range of reasonable expectation on 
the eve of trial. Any delay in setting the case would actually 
have worked against the plaintiff because his share of the 
contingent fee would have been reduced and substitute counsel's 
would have increased as the trial approached. R. 1014, 1636-
1637; see Homeowners' principal brief, pp. 23-29« In view of the 
foregoing undisputed facts, plaintiff's conclusory assertions 
that the recovery at the second trial would have been in excess 
-5-
of $100,000 and that the case could have been settled for more 
than $90,000 on the eve of trial are too speculative to support 
any inference that such a recovery or settlement could have been 
had, particularly in the absence of specific supporting facts. 
Plaintiff's bald assertion that such results could have been 
achieved is not enough. Provenzino v. Merchants Forwarding, 363 
F. Supp. 168, 175 (E.D. Mich. 1973). 
Whether the contingent fee based on the settlement was 
comparable to an hourly fee is not relevant to the reasonableness 
of plaintiff's conduct. Plaintiff knew that the contingent fee 
arrangement involved a gamble and that he might not recover a fee 
sufficient to compensate him for the time he and his staff had 
into the case at an hourly rate. R. 1006. The settlement was 
reasonable beyond douDt, both from the standpoint of the total 
recovery and the net attorney's fee to plaintiff. And even if 
the settlement had not produced the highest possible net fee, the 
plaintiff still could not complain because an attorney should not 
be able to force a client to reject a reasonable settlement offer 
merely because he hopes to increase his fee by doing so. 
Plaintiff's attempt to assert a claim 
of fraudulent inducement was unreasonable. 
The undisputed facts relating to plaintiff's attempt to 
attack the trial court's summary judgment in Homeowners' favor 
based on the claim that he was fraudulently induced to enter the 
fee agreement further shows the unreasonableness of plaintiff's 
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conduct, particularly the unreasonable approach taken by 
plaintiff with respect to this litigation.2 Those facts are: 
1. Plaintiff claims to have discovered the alleged fraud in 
September 1980, just prior to the first trial of the Homeowners' 
claims against the developers, R. 1583-1584, 1589-1590. 
2. Between the time the alleged fraud was supposedly 
discovered in September 1980 and the time plaintiff filed his 
memorandum alleging fraud with the trial court in September 1986, 
plaintiff never told the Homeowners that he felt 
misrepresentations had been made to him or that he claimed to 
have been defrauded by them. R. 1522-1527, 1584-1585, 1589-1590. 
3. Plaintiff never mentioned any claim of fraud in his 
October 1980 letter to the Homeowners reporting on the results of 
the first trial of the Homeowners1 claims against the 
developers. R. 1589-1590. 
4. Plaintiff never raised any claim of fraud when he filed 
his original complaint against the Homeowners in September 1983 
or in any of the seven amended complaints he later proposed. 
R. 2, 264, 539, 533, 708, 834, 911, 1184. 
^Notwithstanding plaintiff's claim to the contrary, the 
Homeowners have denied the plaintiff's allegations of fraud. 
R. 1560. No counter-affidavit was made below in response to 
plaintiff's motion based on the fraud because the object of the 
Homeowners' opposition was to have the motion dismissed as a 
matter of law based on undisputed facts. A counter-affidavit 
would only have created an issue of fact. 
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5. Plaintiff has never offered any reason for the six year 
delay in claiming he was defrauded. (The affidavit of Mr. 
Woodward attached as Exhibit 1 to plaintiff's reply brief does 
not offer any justification for the delay, in spite of 
plaintiff's suggestion that it does.) 
The inferences to be drawn from these undisputed facts are 
inescapable. Since plaintiff offers no explanation for the 
delay, the only inferences that reasonable minds can make from 
these facts are either that there never was any fraud or that the 
alleged misrepresentations were not considered to be material by 
the plaintiff. The inference most favorable to plaintiff is that 
he never considered the alleged misrepresentations material. In 
either case plaintiff should never have asserted the fraud claim, 
and the claim could not have been asserted for any legitimate 
purpose. 
Furthermore, the fraud claim should never have been asserted 
because it is obviously barred by the statute of limitations. 
Plaintiff's claim that the statute of limitations is not 
applicable because he is using the alleged fraud defense is 
disingenuous. Plaintiff seeks to use the allegations of fraud to 
seek affirmative relief in the form of an increase in his 
recovery from the defendant Homeowners1 Association. This is not 
a defensive use of fraud like that referred to in the cases cited 
by plaintiff. Fraud is used defensively only when it defeats a 
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claim for affirmative relief asserted by a plaintiff against the 
defendant raising fraud as a defense, Mid-State Homesf Inc. v. 
Johnston, 547 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Okla. 1976). 
The pleadings and joinder 
of parties shows unreasonableness. 
Similarly, the facts concerning the number of pleadings in 
this case and the number of parties and the circumstance of their 
joinder are not disputed. The pleadings are in the record and 
speak for themselves.^ The inferences drawn from the way 
JAs stated in the Homeowners1 reply brief, not all of the 
pleadings in this case relate to the plaintiff's claim for 
attorneys1 fees. The Homeowners never disclosed the claims to 
which the other pleadings related because they had agreed at 
plaintiff's request to keep the terms of the settlement 
confidential. Since plaintiff has breached the agreement, 
disclosed the settlement and claimed the malpractice claim was 
asserted in bad faith, the claims to which the pleadings relate 
can now be disclosed. The bases for the Homeowners1 malpractice 
claims and the good faith with which they were asserted are shown 
in the Homeowners' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and the affidavit submitted in support found 
in the record at pages 333 through 369. However, it is worth 
noting that one of the claims of malpractice was based on 
plaintiff's admitted dismissal, with prejudice, of one of the 
Homeowners' claims without first consulting with or obtaining 
authority for such dismissal from, any of the Homeowners. The 
settlement of the malpractice claim is further evidence of the 
Homeowners' desire to avoid the stress and expense of 
litigation. Moreover, there is nothing in the record on appeal 
to support plaintiff's claim that the Homeowners' malpractice 
action was motivated by a desire to harass plaintiff or to get 
revenge. Nor do the pages of John Webster's deposition cited by 
plaintiff support such a claim. Mr. Webster's deposition shows 
that the Homeowners were reluctant to file a malpractice action 
or raise the issue of malpractice because they did not want to be 
involved in any more liltigation. (Webster deposition, pp. 166-
170.) 
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plaintiff has pursued this case must be made in the context of 
all of the undisputed facts. The number of pleadings and joinder 
of numerous additional defendants might, taken alone and with all 
inferences drawn in plaintiff's favor, be excused as over-
zealousness on plaintiff's part. But in the context of the 
plaintiff's other conductf no reasonable person (even one drawing 
all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor) could conclude 
that plaintiff prosecuted the suit as he did merely out of a 
desire to recover an attorney's fee due him. Particularly since 
plaintiff's original notice of appeal included an appeal from the 
dismissal of the claims against the other parties though the 
funds necessary to pay plaintiff's claims were then being held by 
court order. R. 1850-1852. 
The nature of the Homeowners 
is relevant to the unreasonableness 
of plaintiff's conduct. 
A description of the nature of the Homeowners is necessary 
to place the plaintiff's conduct in proper perspective. Again, 
it is undisputed that the Homeowners were suffering considerable 
stress as a result of the litigation with the developers and that 
they were very concerned about the expense of litigation. This 
is shown by plaintiff's own letters. R. 1005-1007, 1011-1012. 
Nor is there any dispute regarding the fact that the Homeowners 
are olderf retired people. R. 1637. Plaintiff does, indirectly, 
dispute the claim that the Homeowners are on fixed incomes by 
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offering his testimony that three of the admittedly retired 
people had retired from good jobs and had considerable wealth. 
R. 1667, 1668. Even if plaintiff's claims were accurate, and 
even if they are interpreted in plaintiff's favor, reasonable and 
fair interpretation will not permit one to infer that all (or 
many) of the Homeowners are similarly situated. In the absence 
of factual support in the record rebutting the Homeowners' 
testimony (by the president of the Homeowners' Association) that 
many of the Homeowners are on fixed incomes (R. 1637), no 
inference can be drawn from the facts offered by plaintiff to 
rebut the Homeowners' testimony. 
Thus, interpreting the facts most favorably to plaintiff, 
the only conclusion that can be reached is that the plaintiff 
acted unreasonably both in his refusal to approve the settlement 
and in his prosecution of this action. As a result of that 
conduct he should not be permitted to recover interest on the 
attorney's fee awarded by the trial court. 
III. 
The Homeowners' tender of payment and the 
lack of an agreement regarding fees precludes 
the recovery of interest on the fee. 
The Homeowners' tender of the amount due is relevant for 
purposes of their cross-appeal because it was the plaintiff's 
wrongful refusal to accept the payment of the appropriate fee 
that resulted in the delay in the payment of the fee. Plaintiff 
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was never entitled to more than the amount tendered and should 
not be permitted to recover interest as a result of his 
unwarranted refusal to accept payment. The Homeowners have paid 
the entire amount of interest included in the trial court's 
award. No amount is due plaintiff for which interest has not 
been paid and for which a refund should not be made to the 
Homeowners. 
While an attorney may be entitled to interest on a fee once 
reduced to final judgment even in the absence of an agreement to 
pay interestf the fee is nothing more than an account receivable 
until that time. The interest involved here is for the period 
before the fee claimed was reduced to final judgment. Under the 
authorities cited in the Homeowners1 original brief, since there 
was no agreement to pay interest heref plaintiff is not entitled 
to recover any interest on his attorney's fee. 
Conclusion 
The reasonableness of a party's conduct may be a question of 
fact for the trier-of-fact in some contexts. But where, as here, 
the facts relating to the conduct are undisputed and those facts 
and the inferences that must necessarily be drawn from those 
facts show beyond any doubt that the party has acted 
unreasonably, the reasonableness (or unreasonableness) of the 
party's conduct may be determined as a matter of law. The only 
justification offered by plaintiff for his refusal to approve the 
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settlement desired by the Homeowners is his factually unsupported 
claim that the recovery at trial would have been in excess of 
$100,000 and that the case could have been settled for $90,000. 
The specious nature of these claims is highlighted by the 
undisputed facts showing that the damage evidence at the first 
trial showed a maximum damage claim of under $93,000 and that the 
developers had already rejected plaintiff's $75,000 settlement 
offer. Because of the unusual fee arrangement plaintiff had with 
substitute counsel, who would actually try the case, it was to 
plaintiff's advantage to settle the case at the amount desired by 
the Homeowners. The undisputed facts require reasonable minds to 
conclude, without exception, that plaintiff acted unreasonably. 
He should not be permitted to recover interest since he 
unreasonably refused to accept the appropriate fee and there was 
no agreement providing for the payment of interest on the 
attorney's fee. 
DATED this 21st day of February, 1989. 
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER 
L.R. GARDINER, JR. 
THOMAS R. VUKSINICK 
Attorneys for Respondents and 
Cross-appellants 
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